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Abstract. As systems become larger, more complex, and operate for longer periods of 
time, some change within the system often becomes inevitable.  Particularly in 
systems of systems, with diverse stakeholders, evolutionary development and 
managerial independence, it is not unusual for constituent systems to change in form 
or the way they operate.  Changeability, the ability of a system to change, is often 
considered to be a desirable attribute that allows systems to be robust and to adapt in 
response to changes in context.  However, involuntary changes, such as those that 
occur as a result of a disturbance, are more often problematic than favorable.  In 
some ways, the survivability of a system depends on its ability to prevent, mitigate and 
recover from unintentional changes within the system brought about by disturbances.  
For certain large systems of systems, where there are complex interactions and a 
diverse set of stakeholders, even voluntary changes may be frowned upon, since it 
may be an expensive and time consuming process to approve changes. This paper 
discusses pliability, a new “-ility” that places constraints on the changes a system is 
allowed to make.  Pliability is the ability of a system to change, without “breaking” 
or violating an architecture that the system architects intended and validated.  Like 
changeability, pliability increases robustness by allowing systems to voluntarily 
change in response to changing contexts, and increases survivability by increasing 
the likelihood that unintentional changes are still within the set of allowable 
instances.  It also distinguishes allowable changes from those that would require 
validation and approval from decision makers, making it easier to actually implement 
those changes in large, complex systems.  
Keywords. Pliability, value robustness, survivability, changeability, flexibility, agility, 
CONOPs, concept of operations, system architecture. 
1   Engineering for Change 
“Nothing endures but change.” 
-Heraclites (c. 535 BC – 475 BC).  
 
As systems are expected to do more, their complexity often increases as well.  They 
become more expensive to design, test, build, launch, operate and maintain.  With 
shrinking budgets, particularly in public projects, stakeholders expect large, complex 
systems to have long lifecycles and provide value in spite of changes in context. The 
longer a system exists, the more complex its behavior is, or the more dynamic the 
context in which it operates, the more likely something within the system will change.  
Perhaps there will be a change in components, either in the number and type of 
components, or their attributes and capabilities.  This is particularly an issue with 
systems of systems (SoS), since they are often never fully formed, but rather go 
through evolutionary development as components are added, removed and changed 
over time (Maier, 1998).  Even if the components themselves don’t change, what they 
do within the overall system might change.  Certain F-16s, acting as components of a 
larger military SoS, may change from air-to-air combat roles to air-to-surface attack 
roles.  An emergency response dispatcher may process calls in a priority queuing 
manner (based on location or some other factor), instead of a first-in, first-out (FIFO) 
sequence.  Of course, changes often do not occur in isolation.  A change in 
components, will often require operational changes as well, and vice-versa.  If the 
wireless LAN suddenly fails, then mobile system components may be forced to 
operate near an available Ethernet port.  Similarly, a decision to operate certain 
components in a mobile fashion may require batteries or some other portable power 
source instead of an AC power supply.  
 
There has been increasing research studying how, when and why systems need to 
change in response to shifts in context (McManus and Hastings, 2006).  In particular, 
research has areas such as  
 
 Designing latent capabilities that grant the ability to change at a later date 
(e.g., de Neufville and Scholtes, 2011) 
 The ability to change during operational phases (e.g., Gupta and Goyal, 
1989) 
 The ability to change easily / rapidly (e.g., McGaughey, 1999) 
 The ability to change in size only (e.g., Elkins et al., 2004) 
 
The terms “flexible”, “adaptable”, “agile”, and “modifiable” are some of the labels 
that have been used to describe the ability to change.  Unfortunately, most of these 
terms are not consistently defined in the literature, and there is ambiguity as to their 
exact meaning when applied to systems engineering.  This makes it very difficult for 
stakeholders to communicate the properties that they desire, and for architects to 
know that they’ve met those requirements. The ability to change, known as 
changeability (Ross et al., 2008), is an important quality of a system that allows 
stakeholders to reduce the impact of uncertainty of future contexts. However, not all 
changes are beneficial and care must be taken by architects to ensure that any 
modifications to the components or the way they operate, will not reduce value 
delivery to its stakeholders. 
2   Problems with Change 
While it may seem that the more a system can change, the better it will be able to 
respond to shifts in context, there are limits.  In their minds, and sometimes in 
documents, system architects have a concept of operations (CONOPs)1 that describes 
how the components within the system function and interact with each other to 
produce value to the stakeholders within the context of an operational environment 
(Mekdeci et al, 2011) .  A change in one of the components, their capabilities, or in 
the way the components interact or function, may violate an aspect of the CONOPs, 
and cause a reduction in value delivery.  It is important then to only change what 
should be changed, and not change what shouldn’t.  There are many types of change 
to consider, but they can be broadly categorized into intentional changes and 
unintentional changes. 
Intentional Changes.  Intentional changes are those that decision makers choose to 
execute, often in response to a shift in context or stakeholder needs.  An example of 
an intentional change would be if airline engineers added AC power ports to all the 
seats in an existing aircraft to keep up with market demand.  Intentional changes are 
typically the types of changes described by researchers when they discuss 
changeability, flexibility, agility and other types of change-related system properties.  
However, the concept of “intentional” changes should be clarified further than has 
traditionally been the case.  Sometimes, decision makers may want to implement a 
change to improve value delivery, but end up reducing it instead.  This is because as 
the system complexity grows, and as more changes are made to the system, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to verify and validate the effects that changes will 
have.  Sometimes, the original architects and engineers who designed the system and 
really understood the CONOPs may no longer be available to evaluate impacts of 
planned changes. Subtle assumptions that were not made explicit, may be violated 
with any new changes and could prove to be not only disastrous, but difficult to find 
until it’s too late.  This is particularly a problem with systems of systems that have 
autonomous constituent systems with emergent behavior that is notoriously difficult 
to model.  The larger the system, or the more expensive, or the more stakeholders 
involved, the likelihood of someone wanting to accept responsibility for any one 
particular change decreases.  Thus, there may be a substantial bureaucratic process 
involved for any complex system that makes it extremely time-consuming and costly 
for all but trivial changes to be made.  This “red tape” can seriously impair the ability 
of the system to respond quickly to changes in context, especially if it takes years to 
approve any significant changes.  
 
Unintentional Changes.  Unintentional changes are those that the system is “forced” 
to undergo, that is, changes that occur whether the decision makers want them to or 
not. Some unintentional changes just happen without any intervention or “approval” 
from the stakeholders.  A collision with a bird may cause an engine to malfunction, or 
a power outage may cause a monitoring system to fail. Other unintentional changes 
happen after decision makers authorize them, but only because they have to, in 
response to some other event beyond their control.  A labor strike may force a city’s 
engineers to shut down the subway, or a new environmental regulation may cause a 
chemical plant to replace certain older equipment with newer, more environmentally-
friendly models.  Since unintended changes are likely to be problematic, system 
                                                          
1 To some researchers and practitioners, the word “CONOPs” refers to documentation that 
describes how a system works, rather than the concept of how the system works itself.  
architects typically try to minimize their causes and effects as much as possible.  
Unintentional changes that are the result of endogenous forces, such as random 
component failure, are the focus of reliability engineering (Leveson, 1995), whereas 
system survivability and robustness strive to prevent, mitigate and recover from 
unintended changes caused by exogenous forces such as lightning strikes and resource 
shortages. 
3   Change in Tradespace Studies 
 
Tradespace studies are often used to help decision makers assess and compare various 
system designs in the conceptual stage of a system’s lifecycle (Stump et al., 2004).  
Typically, designs are modeled and simulated and their overall utility (as determined 
by stakeholder/decision maker preferences) is plotted against cost.  For a system that 
does not change, the utility and cost is constant for a particular context (Figure 1).  
However, if the system can change, then for a given context, there can be a range of 
utility/cost that a system can achieve or change to (Figure 2).  Several interesting 
questions arise. Suppose in Figure 2 that system B differs from system A only in that 
an extra component is added (providing additional value at additional cost).  Are these 
systems just two different instances of a similar architecture?  Should the 
changeability of systems A and B be represented somehow in the tradespace (Ross 
and Hastings, 2006)?  When does a change cause a system to become another system?  
What defines a simple transition change from an evolution change?  
 
Fig. 1. Sample plot of static system.                            Fig. 2. Sample plot of changeable system.                             
 
Changes are not always as discrete and obvious as adding components.  Sometimes 
small changes in the way a system operates could have large cost and performance 
consequences. As an example, if a 911 call center prioritizes calls based on location, it 
may have vastly different performance results that one whose mode of operation is to 
respond to calls in a first-in, first-out manner.  Explicitly trading the modes of 
operation may result in multiple points in the tradespace for the same set of 
components. If the modes of operation are not traded, then system architects must 
recognize that if operators use the same system in a different way, it may appear to 
“move” in the tradespace. It is for this reason that system architects should explicitly 
consider an operations “envelope” around points to account for various modes of 
operation. 
 
It is clear that systems may need to change in response to varying contexts and do 
change (intentionally or not).  What is lacking is a system property that explicitly 
addresses the need to specify limits on what should be allowed to change, in order to 
ensure that any modifications of the system’s form or mode of operation does not 
adversely affect its value delivery. The authors feel that a new “ility” is needed – one 
that recognizes the need for change, but also recognizes that there are limits to what 
should be allowed (i.e. there are “bad” changes that should be avoided or prevented). 
The term we use for this new ility, pliability, has not been widely used in the literature 
before. Our research seeks to precisely define the term and make it useful to 
researchers and practitioners alike. 
4   Defining Pliability 
The English word pliable is defined as “capable of being bent or flexed or twisted 
without breaking” (WordNet 3.1, 2012). For systems engineering, pliability can be 
defined as “…the ability of a system to change, without breaking its system 
architecture”.  We define a system architecture to be a collection of components and 
an associated concept of operations (CONOPs), whose instances provide some value, 
within a particular context.  Since a system architecture can allow different sets of 
components and CONOPs, the form of a system is a specific collection of components 
(and their associated capabilities), while a mode of operation is a specific CONOPs (a 
way that those components are functioning and interacting with each other).  An 
instance is a specific form and mode of operation pair, that belongs to the system 
architecture.  Thus, 
 
             (1) 
 
where Iij is the instance consisting of the ith form specified in the set of 
components and the jth mode of operations specified in the CONOPs of some 
particular system architecture.  The pliable set of a system architecture, is the 
set of all possible instances that are allowed by the system architects to belong 
to that system architecture.  Thus, we can write that for system architecture X: 
 
 
                                (2) 
 
where n is the total number of sets of components and m is the total number of modes 
of operation specified in the form and CONOPs respectively.  We can also say that a 
realized system, is an actual physical realization of a system architecture that provides 
value to stakeholders.  Therefore, pliability is the property of a system to be able to 
switch to other allowable instances of a system architecture, specified by the 
architecture’s pliable set. 
 
If a system architecture has multiple instances, then a system always assumes one of 
these instances at any time t, and can transition to the other instances defined in the 
pliable set of its system architecture, while remaining the same system.  If a system 
transitions to an instance outside of its system architecture, then it becomes an 
unapproved system.  Whether this new system will “work” (i.e. provide adequate 
value to the stakeholders) is unknown (at best), since it does not belong to the set of 
allowable instances, defined by the architects who designed the system to begin with.  
Thus, it is usually in the best interest of the architects and decision makers to not let 
systems change into instances outside of their system architecture.  
5    Using Pliability 
After we have defined what a system architecture is and its relationship to an instance 
and a realized system, the concepts and usefulness of pliability can be illustrated with 
a simple example.  Suppose a port authority wants to develop a maritime security 
system of systems (SoS) that will identify targets as they pass through a particular 
area of interest (AOI).  The stakeholders identify two choices that they wish to 
explore: The first choice is the number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
include in the SoS (either 4 or 8), and the second choice relates to the use of a manned 
patrol aircraft (MPA).  If a MPA is added to the SoS, then it is possible to operate in a 
double target confirmation mode by requiring both manned and unmanned vehicles to 
positively identify a target.  This mode takes longer, but typically has more accurate 
results as opposed to a single target confirmation done by UAVs only.  Therefore, the 
stakeholders initially want the system architects to develop and test four designs: 
 
1. D1 = [4 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
2. D2 = [8 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
3. D3 = [4 UAVs / 1 MPA, Double target confirmation] 
4. D4 = [8 UAVs / 1 MPA, Double target confirmation] 
 
Using Pliability in Architecting Systems.  Given the requirements, the system 
architects can model and simulate the four systems that satisfy the component and 
CONOPs considerations that stakeholders are interested in.  However, the acquirers 
ask the architects to make the systems pliable, then the architects must specify exactly 
what changes can be made to the systems without breaking their system architecture.  
Based on their initial concepts, the architects realize that switching between 4 and 8 
UAVs is trivial.  If this is the case, then perhaps a system architecture can be defined 
that has two instances – one with 4 UAVs and one with 8 UAVs, and a system can 
transition between the two, as necessary.   However, due to safety concerns, mixing 
manned and unmanned vehicles requires a more complex air traffic control (ATC) 
implementation than just having unmanned vehicles alone, and therefore it is not 
possible for a system to transition from one type of ATC to another without a very 
high cost.  For the stakeholder preferences under consideration, this change cost 
would be considered prohibitive.  A purely unmanned vehicle system can work with 
the complex ATC, so transitions are possible if such a system were to be 
implemented.  Therefore, there are actually two distinct system architectures, defined 
by the type of ATC they use (illustrated with their connected instances in Figure 3) 
meaning there are two distinct systems, SS and SC not four.  One system can transition 
between two instances (4 or 8 UAVs), while the other can transition between four 
instances (4 or 8 UAVs, 0 or 1 MPA).  
 
1. Simple ATC SoS (Ss):  
o I1S = [4 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
o I2S = [8 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
2. Complex ATC SoS (Sc): 
o I1C = [4 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
o I2C = [8 UAVs / 0 MPA, Single target confirmation] 
o I3C = [4 UAVs / 1 MPA, Double target confirmation] 
o I4C = [8 UAVs / 1 MPA, Double target confirmation] 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Comparison between two different system architectures of the maritime security SoS. 
 
When the two systems are modeled and simulated, they generate tradespaces as 
shown in Figure 4.  Note, that a system with multiple instances doesn’t just generate a 
single utility/cost point in a tradespace for a given context.  Instead, it is a collection 
of utility/cost points generated by each of the instances in its architecture that it can 
transition to.  Similarly, a tradespace can be generated “top-down” from a system 
architecture, by generating utility/cost points for all allowable instances within its 
pliable set. 
 Fig. 4. Tradespace for two different system architectures of the maritime security SoS. 
6.   Using Pliability to Achieve Survivability, Value Robustness and 
Agility 
Survivability has been defined as the ability of systems to minimize the impact of 
finite-duration disturbances on value delivery (Richards, 2009).  This requires the 
effective handling of change within systems – either by preventing, mitigating or 
recovering from unwanted change caused by disturbances, or intentionally changing 
in response to new contexts.  By requiring that systems be pliable, survivability and 
value robustness can be increased in three different ways; (1) By requiring system 
architects to go through a design cycle that explores the limits of their systems, (2) by 
increasing the number of safe instances that system can transition to, and (3) pre-
validating change options to reduce the time and effort required for stakeholders to 
approve changes, allowing them to be implemented quicker and easier.  These 
benefits are discussed below: 
 
Disturbance Discovery and the Pliability Design Cycle. In defining the pliability of 
systems, the architects must specify what is allowed to be changeable within the 
system, which means they must provide some guarantee that such changes will not 
adversely harm its value delivery.  To do this, they need to examine the parameters 
within the system architecture, both in components and in CONOPs, to see what can 
vary, what can’t, and what the limits should be.  This exercise forces architects to 
think about the causes and effects of change within their system, perhaps at a level 
they normally would not have.  In the maritime security example, system architects 
would have to determine how many UAVs the SoS would support beyond the 4 and 8 
suggested by the stakeholders.  This is because it’s possible that some disturbance 
may cause UAVs to be unavailable, or perhaps an increase in traffic would necessitate 
adding additional vehicles to meet the demand.  In this example, they might realize 
that due to range limitations, they have to divide the AOI into two areas, meaning the 
minimum number of UAVs necessary to cover the AOI would be two.  Similarly, due 
to bandwidth constraints, the maximum number of UAVs would be 12.  At this point, 
they can analyze whether these constraints will satisfy their value robustness 
requirements.  What is the likelihood, given labor shortages, bad weather, random 
component failures, and other disturbances, that the SoS may find itself with less than 
two available UAVs?  Similarly, what conditions would have to exist for the system 
to need more than 12 UAVs?  In an iterative fashion, as more disturbances and 
change agents are considered, changes in a candidate architecture are made, which 
lead to an expansion or reduction in the pliable set, from which feasible systems are 
evaluated.  Thus, the process of defining an architecture and its pliable set becomes a 
cycle (Figure 5), where system architectures and systems are analyzed in the presence 
of disturbances and change agents, through the concept of pliability. 
 
 
Fig. 5. System cycle for pliability 
 
Increasing Available Options. If a system is pliable, then that means it can change 
(to some extent) and still maintain acceptable performance under the original contexts 
that were considered.  Survivability is increased automatically as the pliable set of a 
system architecture expands, simply because the outcome system state of an 
unintentional change is more likely to be contained within the pliability of the system 
it affects.  Returning to the maritime security example, a system that provides 
acceptable value with between 2 and 12 UAVs is going to be able to survive hostile 
attacks, component failures, increases in fuel prices and all sorts of other endogenous 
and exogenous changes that impacts the number of operational UAVs better than a 
system that is only designed to be able to accommodate either 4 or 8 UAVs.   
 
Increasing Agility.  By pre-validating reachable instances in the conceptual phase, 
the amount of approval necessary for changes after design should decrease.  This 
reduces the “red tape” and allows complex systems to respond quicker to context 
shifts, increasing the ability for a system to change quickly (i.e. increasing agility 
(McGaughey, 1999)) in response to changes in context.    
7    Conclusion 
Change happens, and it is something that system architects must consider for complex 
systems with long lifecycle, operating in dynamic environments.  Not all change is 
valuable, and successful systems will be able to avoid, mitigate and recover from 
harmful changes, and implement beneficial ones in a timely and cost-efficient 
manner. Incorporating change into engineering design is something that many 
researchers and practitioners realize is necessary; however, pliability distinguishes 
systems from their architectures, and introduces the concept that the architecture 
should be validated so that it has multiple valid instances to which a system may 
transition, should the need arise.  In this way, pliability increases survivability, value 
robustness, and possibly agility, by requiring architects to consider disturbances, 
context changes and changes that might not have been considered, increases the safe 
options available to a system in the event that a change occurs (intentional or not), 
and decreases the red tape involved in implementing intended changes.   
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